Local Politics of Reconstruction Along and Across Azad Kashmir's Border with Pakistan by Schild, Pascale
 1 
 
Local Politics of Reconstruction along and across Azad Kashmir’s Border with Pakistan 
Pascale Schild, Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich 
 
Accepted version 
Schild, Pascale 2015: Local politics of reconstruction along and across Azad Kashmir’s 
border with Pakistan. Contemporary South Asia 23(3): 292-313. 
 
 
Drawing on anthropological approaches to state borders as processes, this paper examines the 
political boundary between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir through the window of reconstruction 
politics after the 2005 earthquake in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Kashmir. "The border" 
became inscribed into politics and power relations in Muzaffarabad through a locally 
contested reconstruction bureaucracy which provided Pakistan with the means to dominate 
reconstruction in Azad Kashmir. Activists from Muzaffarabad widely criticised this 
domination. However, local politicisation of reconstruction revealed contradictory effects of 
the border on power relations in Muzaffarabad. For most activists, the political relationship 
between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir was characterised by domination as well as complicity 
that undermined local concerns such as the reconstruction of their city. Therefore, they 
opposed their own government as well and transgressed the border into Pakistan through the 
creation of alliances with national politicians to put pressure on the government of Azad 
Kashmir. In taking advantage of power disparities between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir, these 
alliances not only confirmed but also undermined the nation state's domination over the 
region by manipulating and circumventing its reconstruction bureaucracy. 
[Local politics; Azad Kashmir; border; reconstruction; Pakistan] 
 
 
In Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-administrated Azad Kashmir, I met with a local 
group of self-designated “political activists” who had just launched a “reconstruction 
campaign”. Addressing the issue of state authorities’ failure in providing for the 
reconstruction of the city that was destroyed by an earthquake four years ago, these political 
activists organised public protests and media meetings to which state officials were invited in 
order to explain and justify their lack of progress in reconstruction. Following the concerns 
and activities of these political actors in my ethnographic fieldwork1, I also encountered the 
group’s political allies, journalists and local politicians, and their opponents, state officials 
and national politicians. Through my interactions with state officials and their local critics, the 
issue, which came up frequently in conversations about the reconstruction of Muzaffarabad, 
 
1 I conducted fieldwork in Muzaffarabad between 2009 and 2011 and in two phases amounting to 15 months. 
Fieldwork was generously funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) and the German Research 
Council (DFG).   
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was an urban development scheme commonly referred to as the “master plan”. Specifying 
more than 100 projects, the master plan, I learnt, was the main guideline for the city’s 
reconstruction2. Muzaffarabad, counting around 100,000 inhabitants, was one of the areas 
most affected by the earthquake. Thousands of people died largely as the result of building 
collapses and more than 10,000 families were left homeless. Against this background, both 
state officials and their critics agreed that, for a better future, Muzaffarabad required planning 
to mitigate the city’s disaster vulnerability3. Although the basic version of the master plan had 
been completed and the required financial resources mobilised by the end of 2006, none of the 
proposed projects were implemented even three years later. The situation became only 
slightly better in the following months and years. During my last short visit to Muzaffarabad 
in March 2012, almost six-and-a-half years after the earthquake, a few projects had started but 
were still under construction.  
Why did the implementation of the master plan stagnate, even though planning and money 
were available? Depending on whom I asked, either the nonchalant governments in Pakistan 
or Azad Kashmir, particular state reconstruction authorities, national or regional politicians 
and bureaucrats, the Chinese contractor companies or the time-consuming bureaucratic 
procedures, in general, were identified as the cause of the enormous delay. While state 
officials tended to blame one another, political activists and journalists from outside the 
administration and government frequently claimed that the general indifference of the state 
elite towards the local population was responsible for the precarious situation of their city4. 
While looking into the politicisation of the master plan delay and the trouble it caused among 
national, regional and local actors, inside and outside of state bureaucracy and government, I 
 
2  The master plan document contains an extensive urban development study, conducted by the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Evaluating the city’s hazards, JICA prepared an urban land use plan 
and recommended several reconstruction and development measures for urban Muzaffarabad (JICA 2007). 
Based on these recommendations, Pakistan selected 104 projects for the Muzaffarabad City Development 
Programme (MCDP) which include the construction of roads, bridges, commercial and public buildings, and 
satellite towns for the relocation of the population living in high-risk areas, the drafting of building codes and 
settlement restrictions for public and private housing, etc. Although MCDP is, in fact, only a part of the “master 
plan”, the term commonly refers to MCDP rather than the original JICA study. 
3 The earthquake occurred on October 8, 2005, with a magnitude of 7.6 on the Richter scale affecting parts of the 
Pakistani Province Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the northern part of Azad Kashmir. People’s general vulnerability 
to disasters was exposed through the widespread devastation in terms of fatalities and the scale of the damage to 
key infrastructure such as roads, water and power supply, government buildings, schools, hospitals and people’s 
homes. Overall, the disaster caused the death of almost 80,000 people and left over three million people 
homeless (EERI 2006). 
4 Social actors critical to state authorities’ performance in the reconstruction of Muzaffarabad frequently pointed 
to the continuing and even enhanced vulnerability of the city as a consequence of the non-implementation of 
crucial reconstruction measures. Muzaffarabad, located on the banks of the Neelum and Jehlum rivers, is 
surrounded by hills where landslides are frequent during the rainy season in winter. As the population of 
Muzaffarabad increased after the earthquake due to migration from the surrounding rural areas, so did the 
number of people (still) exposed to the city’s hazards, which include earthquakes, floods, land- and mudslides. 
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found that “the border” between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir was key to understanding the 
politics of reconstruction in Muzaffarabad.    
 
Historical Trajectories of Azad Kashmir 
By emphasising “the border” with quotations, I intend to indicate that Pakistan and Azad 
Kashmir are separated from, yet connected with, each other via a political boundary that 
differs from “classical” borders between, and within, nation states. The political status of 
Azad Kashmir vis-à-vis Pakistan is highly ambiguous, since it has never been defined in 
“classical” legal terms. Azad Kashmir is neither a nation state nor a province of Pakistan, but 
rather a “provisional” political entity, which features aspects of both autonomy from and 
dependence on Pakistan. Despite its legal political ambiguities, the border between Pakistan 
and Azad Kashmir is territorially defined, materialised in the environment (through 
checkpoints and police), and clearly indicated on maps5. 
The ambiguities regarding Azad Kashmir’s political status are historically related to 
Pakistan’s territorial dispute with India about the former princely state of Jammu and 
Kashmir, of which the region had formed part. Reflecting Azad Kashmir’s strategic geo-
political and ideological location for Pakistan in the Kashmir conflict, the nation state’s 
“internal” ambiguous boundary with Azad Kashmir is intimately linked to its “external” 
disputed border with India in Jammu and Kashmir (see Hussain 2005). 
Shortly after the partition of the sub-continent and Pakistan’s emergence in 1947, the Jammu 
and Kashmir Muslim Conference, which favoured the state’s accession to Pakistan, 
established the “provisional government” of Azad (free) Kashmir. Initially, the Azad Kashmir 
government defined itself as a war council whose objective was the liberation of Jammu and 
Kashmir from the Maharaja’s rule and, subsequently, after he declared the state’s accession to 
India, from India’s control (Rose 1992, 237). The military conflict between the “Azad 
forces”, supported by Pakistani “invaders”, and the Indian army lasted until a United Nations-
negotiated ceasefire came into effect in January 1949. In this context, Pakistan and India also 
agreed to the United Nations’ resolution on a plebiscite for Jammu and Kashmir. The 
plebiscite should determine the state’s accession to either Pakistan or India. 
The plebiscite, however, never took place and Azad Kashmir somehow became trapped in the 
historical legacy of what Pakistan considers to be the “unfinished partition” of former British 
India according to the “two-nation theory”, which asserted that there were two separate 
Muslim and Hindu nations in the sub-continent. Although the “provisional government” of 
 
5  Whereas citizens of Azad Kashmir and Pakistan are not restricted in crossing the border, foreigners are 
required to obtain an entry permit from the Pakistan Ministry of Interior.  
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Azad Kashmir favoured accession to Pakistan, the government of Pakistan refused to 
recognise Azad Kashmir de jure as a part of Pakistan. The legal integration of Azad Kashmir 
into the nation state would have undermined Pakistan’s demand for the plebiscite and, 
ultimately, weakened its strategy for obtaining all of Jammu and Kashmir6. According to 
official representation, Pakistan has been “administrating” Azad Kashmir until the plebiscite 
resolves the political status of Jammu and Kashmir, including Azad Kashmir. However, 
Pakistan has, in fact, been integrating Azad Kashmir into the nation state through various 
bureaucratic and constitutional measures of domination. 
While refusing to recognise Azad Kashmir de jure as a part of Pakistan, Pakistan also denied 
the “provisional government” of Azad Kashmir recognition as an “autonomous” government 
for, and in, Kashmir. Consequently, the United Nations negotiated with India and Pakistan 
(rather than with Azad Kashmir) on Jammu and Kashmir and demoted Azad Kashmir’s status 
to a “local authority” (Rose 1992, 336; Snedden 2012, 88–89). The Pakistan government 
agreed with this “demotion”, since it “had assumed responsibility for all Pakistani aspects of 
the Kashmir dispute and wanted no local rival” (Snedden 2012, 89). Azad Kashmir’s 
international marginalisation ultimately prepared the ground for its dependence on Pakistan 
and, subsequently, Pakistan’s domination over Azad Kashmir by gradually integrating the 
region — “in practice but not in theory” — into the nation state7. 
Until the 1970s, Pakistan’s Ministry of Kashmir Affairs “probably had the best claim to being 
the real head of the Azad Kashmir government” (Rose 1992, 238)8. Pakistan’s bureaucratic 
domination over Azad Kashmir was frequently opposed as well as assisted by the fractious 
and, thus, manipulable Muslim Conference, whose leaders cooperated with the Pakistan 
government in order to weaken their political opponents (Snedden 2012, 96–97). 
With the limited democratisation of politics in Pakistan, initiated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 
1970s, political changes also occurred in Azad Kashmir. Under the “Interim Constitution Act” 
of 1974 a prime ministerial “democracy” was introduced in Azad Kashmir. Since then, Azad 
 
6 Given the state’s majority Muslim population, Pakistan appeared to be confident about the plebiscite’s outcome 
and Jammu and Kashmir’s ultimate accession to Pakistan. 
7 In April 1949 the Azad Kashmir government signed the Karachi agreement with the government of Pakistan, 
which confirmed Azad Kashmir’s status as a local authority vis-à-vis the nation state. In this agreement, Azad 
Kashmir delegated powers regarding military defence and international affairs (such as the negotiations with the 
United Nations on Kashmir) to Pakistan (Hussain 2005, 115–116; Snedden 2012, 90–91). 
8  According to the “Rules of Business” ordinances in the 1950s the Muslim Conference appointed the 
government of Azad Kashmir, comprising the president and ministers. Ultimately, the Azad Kashmir 
government, dominated by the Muslim Conference, was subordinate to Pakistan’s Ministry. “All legislation [the 
government] passed only had the ‘force of law’ after it received [the Ministry’s] concurrence” (Snedden 2012, 
93). In addition to the powerful Ministry, Pakistan dominated Azad Kashmir by “lending” officers to the Azad 
Kashmir administration. Based on “mutually accepted traditions” (Snedden 2012, 93), these arrangements 
enabled Azad Kashmir to overcome its lack of experienced administrative personnel and, simultaneously, 
provided Pakistan with an instrument to control Azad Kashmir’s administration. 
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Kashmiris have been participating in multi-party elections of the legislative assembly, from 
which the prime minister is elected among its members. The democratisation of politics in 
Azad Kashmir, however, was limited, since the various military and civilian governments in 
Pakistan after 1970 frequently infringed on Azad Kashmir’s “internal autonomy” — not least 
because the Interim Constitution Act sanctioned such an infringement (Snedden 2012, 104–
107). The Act institutionalised Pakistan’s domination over Azad Kashmir by establishing the 
“Azad Kashmir Council”. In contrast to the legislative assembly, the council, comprising the 
prime minister of Pakistan, the minister of Kashmir affairs, five members of the Pakistan 
national assembly, the president and prime minister of Azad Kashmir and six members of the 
Azad Kashmir legislative assembly, was authorised to legislate on “virtually everything of 
any importance” (Rose 1992, 204), including defence, diplomacy, finance, police, 
development, electricity, transport, communication, etc. (Snedden 2012, 104). Through these 
constitutional measures, Azad Kashmir was in practice — but not in theory — integrated, like 
a province, into the nation state, but, unlike a province, deprived of formal political 
representation in the national government and parliament of Pakistan9. In addition to the Azad 
Kashmir Council, Pakistan continued to dominate Azad Kashmir through bureaucratic 
measures, most notably the “lending” of officers to the Azad Kashmir administration. 
Pakistan appoints the most influential positions within Azad Kashmir’s administration, 
including the chief secretary who acts as the intermediary between the government and the 
administration (Snedden 2012, 156) 10 . Azad Kashmir’s unequal relations with Pakistan, 
hidden somehow behind “the border” and Azad Kashmir’s consequential state-like 
appearance (i.e. the separate government, parliament, administration and judiciary), have set 
crucial conditions for political life in the region. 
With reference to state and non-state, local, regional and national actors’ practices and 
representations, this paper examines the border between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir as multi-
layered, contradictory and conjunctural processes of separation and connection, negotiation 
and contestation. Drawing on anthropological approaches to borders and boundaries, I argue 
to combine the “‘big picture’ of ‘national’ and ‘international’ relations” (Donnan and Wilson 
1994, 10) with the perspectives and practices of social actors who, in particular situations and 
 
9 Despite the Pakistan members comprising the minority in the council, they are able to dominate the council’s 
decisions and procedures. The prime minister of Pakistan acts as chairman and nominates the five Pakistanis, 
whereas the legislative assembly (and not the prime minister of Azad Kashmir) appoints the six Azad Kashmiris 
to the council. Given the fractious and heterogeneous party politics in Azad Kashmir, the council includes Azad 
Kashmir members “from different political parties with varying political loyalties and aspirations in relation to 
Islamabad powerbrokers” (Snedden 2012, 104). 
10 In addition to the chief secretary, the Pakistan government also appoints the finance secretary, accountant 
general, inspector general police and the chief engineer of the Azad Kashmir administration (Snedden 2012, 
162). 
 6 
for particular reasons, engage with the Pakistan–Azad Kashmir border in particular ways. 
This paper may add to the “big picture”, which more generalised reflections on historical and 
legal political trajectories fail to do, that is, an ethnographically informed analysis on how 
social actors “enact” the Pakistan–Azad Kashmir border through situational and strategic, 
symbolical and practical crossings and non-crossings.  
 
Anthropology of Borders and Boundaries 
In anthropology, political borders of (and within) states have long been distinguished from 
symbolic and social boundaries of groups (see Lamot and Molnar 2002). Thus, whereas 
borders were considered territorial limits defining legal political sovereignties and subjects 
(such as states and citizens), boundaries were conceived as social constructs producing 
symbolic differences and identities (such as class and gender, ethnic and religious groups) 
(Fassin 2011, 214). The theoretical and practical distinctions between state borders and 
boundaries of social groups were a critique of classical studies in anthropology that were less 
concerned with boundaries (and borders) themselves and more with cultural beliefs and social 
structures of groups that boundaries (and borders) enclosed, and thus frequently proceeded 
from the assumption that social and symbolic boundaries coincided with territorial borders, 
and vice versa (Alvarez 1995, 453; Donnan and Wilson 1999, 20; Fassin 2011, 214). Shifting 
from questions of what boundaries enclosed to questions of how boundaries occur, Fredrik 
Barth criticised conceptions of ethnic groups as culturally (and territorially) “bounded” 
communities by pointing to social actors’ situational and strategic representations of, and 
practices within and across, boundaries (Barth 1969, 15; see also Donnan and Wilson 1999, 
21). From this perspective, social groups’ boundaries occur as two-sided processes of 
inclusion and exclusion, identification and categorisation, and self-ascription and ascription 
by others, in which social actors, for various reasons and in various situations, differentiate 
between “us” and “them” (Barth 1969; see also Donnan and Wilson 1999, 21–22). 
Challenging notions of social groups as territorialised national (and subnational) 
communities, this perspective also enabled transnational perspectives on social networks and 
cultural identities across the territorial and legal political limits of nation states (Alvarez 1995, 
456–458).  
The distinction of boundaries and borders in anthropology, however, restricted perspectives 
on how political borders of states and cultural boundaries of social groups are related (Fassin 
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2011)11. According to Donnan and Wilson, the literature on ethnic groups and boundaries, 
despite emphasising that boundaries are two-sided processes, concentrates “on one side rather 
than the other”, on internal identification rather than external categorisation, and, thereby, 
tends to neglect the “constraint and shaping influence of wider structures, such as those of 
[…] the state” (Donnan and Wilson 1999, 25). The anthropology of borders, as the authors 
argue, offers a way of extending the analysis of symbolic identifications of social groups to 
include territorial and legal political categorisations and, ultimately, of examining how these 
processes overlap and intertwine as well as diverge and collide. From the authors’ 
perspective, despite (most) state borders being legally recognised and territorially defined 
(materialised in environments and indicated on maps), they are no more stable and no less 
processual than social groups’ boundaries. State borders are also always symbolic boundaries: 
social constructions defining people and places in relation to states and producing differences 
between them. Nonetheless, “social relations, defined in part by the state”, as Donnan and 
Wilson argue, also “transcend the territorial limits of the state and, in so doing, transform the 
structure of the state” (Donnan and Wilson 1999, 34)12. 
The processes of borders are not limited to transformations of territories and sovereignties. 
State borders are much more than territorial and legal political boundaries — “not just 
stretches of territory, but also places invested with subjectivity” (Radu 2012, 29). State 
borders are versatile techniques of maintaining and altering, imposing and contesting 
differences between “us” and “them”, “here” and “there”, rather than merely evidences for 
such differences (Green 2014, 356). The perspective on state borders as processes of 
“becoming” (Radu 2010, 409) refers to social actors’ symbolic and material practices of 
“bordering” (Green 2014, 350) places and people and, thereby, clearly resonates with 
 
11 In contrast to symbolic boundaries of social groups, territorial borders and state boundaries have rarely been 
subject to anthropological investigation before the 1970s and often appeared as a mere backdrop to studies of 
other social processes (Donnan and Wilson 1999, 33). Exceptional in this regard is Abner Cohen’s ethnography 
on “Arab Border-Villages in Israel” (1965) which examined how the “border situation” created by the 
establishment of the Israeli state transformed political practices and power relations in the local Palestinian 
society. In 1974, John Cole and Eric Wolf published “The Hidden Frontier”, a historically informed ethnography 
on the different ethnic identities in two villages of Northern Italy. The two villages, one German-speaking, the 
other Romance-speaking, had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but were transferred to Italy after the 
First World War and, with the brief interlude of German rule during the Second World War, have been part of 
the Italian state ever since. Studying the dialectical relations between the two villages and between the villages 
and the two nation states to which the villages historically have belonged, Cole and Wolf examine how local and 
translocal processes, ethnic groups and state borders intersect (Cole and Wolf 1999, 4–5; see also Donnan and 
Wilson 1999, 32–33). The authors introduced a political economy approach to symbolic boundaries in 
anthropology, emphasising that state borders have crucial political, economic and social implications for local 
societies and, furthermore, that social actors also engage with state borders in various symbolical ways.  
12 The processes of negotiation and contestation of borders and legal political boundaries are particularly evident 
in situations in which social groups, represented by the state as “ethnic” minorities, represent themselves as 
“nations”, and perhaps as nations in search of their own states. Thus, cultural boundaries may be transformed 
into, both, regional intra-state borders representing subnational groups (as ethnic minorities) and state borders 
representing national communities (Donnan and Wilson 1999, 8). 
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anthropological approaches of “the state” (Das and Poole 2004; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; 
Sharma and Gupta 2006) as “a multilayered, contradictory translocal ensemble of institutions, 
practices, and people” (Sharma and Gupta 2006, 6). According to Das and Poole, the 
practices, people and places related to the territorial (or social) margins of nation states “break 
open the solidity often attributed to the state” (2004, 20) by exposing ambiguities and 
contradictions of territorial and legal political boundaries in terms of inside and outside, 
public and private, legal and illegal. Thus, anthropology on the territorial “margin” of the 
state, as Das and Poole suggest, may reveal the border as an “active centre of complex 
negotiations of conflicting interests and contradictory imaginaries” (Gosh 2011, 58) and, thus, 
of processes which undermine entrenched (self-)representations of “the state” as a 
bureaucratically rationalised, centrally organised and territorially defined sovereignty. 
Blurring the boundaries between state and society, the processes of borders engage 
negotiations and contestations between various state and non-state, local and translocal actors 
and institutions (see also Vaughan-Williams 2012). Crossing and staying within state 
territories, as well as transgressing and complying with legal political categorisations, social 
actors, within and outside state bureaucracy and government, “enact” the borders of the state 
in various situations and ways. State borders may thus become internal and external, visible 
and invisible, territorial and symbolical, local and translocal, and “multiplied and reduced” 
(Balibar 1998, 220). 
The approach to state borders as techniques and processes of negotiation and contestation of 
political power relations has been increasingly applied to the anthropology of South Asia in 
recent years, as the emerging scholarship on South Asian borderlands demonstrates (Gellner 
2013; Gosh 2011; Ibrahim 2009; van Schendel 2005; 2013; van Schendel and de Maaker 
2014). According to van Schendel (2013), borders in South Asia (as compared to Europe) are 
ethnographically rather understudied. Since many of the region’s territorial and legal political 
borders are considered “sensitive”, state officials have been restricting access to borderlands 
for anthropologists13.  
Piliavsky, however, illustrates in her ethnography on the provincial border between Rajasthan 
and Madhya Pradesh in India that processes of negotiation and contestation occur “at” borders 
between as well as within nation states14 . Criticising the conception of “borderlands” as 
 
13 With reference to the centrality of territory in state self-definition, van Schendel argues that “every modern 
state considers its borders to be problematic, vulnerable, and in need of special policy measures” (van Schendel 
2013, 267). The territoriality of states in South Asia, where many of the region’s borders are contested and 
militarised, however, seems to be particularly precarious and, thus, especially in need of military measures. 
14 Donnan and Wilson conceptualise political borders between, and within, states as related processes (1999, 8). 
Borders within nation states, however, have rarely been subject to anthropological investigations. Besides the 
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somehow territorially, socially and politically definable entities at the borders between nation 
states, she argues that South Asian borderland studies often ignore “the borders” as 
conceptual objects which enclose, divide and relate people and places and, thus, produce 
“border situations” also within nation states which neither in kind nor in degree differ from 
processes “at” international borders. With reference to provincial boundaries and 
consequential administrative and political divisions within states, she points to “the sense of 
border life” which also pervades state territories. Resonating with the perspective on borders 
as processes and techniques, she argues to conceptualise borders as “a mechanism in the set of 
categorical distinctions we call the state. Borders are structural entities and as such can 
generate different effects in different circumstances. They can enclose as well as relate; they 
can form barriers as much as frontiers; they can facilitate their crossing as well as enclose and 
divide, functioning equally well both as limits and prompts for movement” (Piliavsky 2013, 
41). 
The border between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir presents an interesting case “in between” the 
territorial and social margin of the Pakistani nation state. Located at the Line of Control, the 
international border between Pakistan and India in Jammu and Kashmir, Azad Kashmir’s 
ambiguous legal political boundaries with Pakistan simultaneously include and exclude the 
region in and from the national territory. 
With reference to the anthropological approach to borders (and boundaries) as techniques and 
mechanisms of power, this paper examines the questions of how “the border” occurs in 
political processes of reconstruction in Muzaffarabad, how “the border” becomes inscribed 
into politics and power relations in Muzaffarabad through state and non-state, local and 
translocal actors’ practices of “bordering” (places and people), and the consequential 
struggles over power relations. Analysing the (sub-)national border between Azad Kashmir 
and Pakistan as processes of negotiation and contestation of power relations in Muzaffarabad, 
this paper may contribute to a more profound and locally anchored understanding of a widely 
understudied “border situation” in South Asia, frequently overshadowed by the “big picture” 




case examined by Piliavsky (2013) exceptions in this regard are also presented by the studies of Joshi (2013) and 
Erb (2014) on contested borders within the Indian and Indonesian nation states respectively. With reference to 
theoretical perspectives on external state borders, Erb analyses processes of internal state borders, arguing that 
the borders within states “can still be seen as places that threaten national and local security, that divide people 
who are considered wholly ‘other’, and that can become arenas of conflict causing grave insecurity to the people 
who inhabit them” (Erb 2014, 126). 
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Disaster and Politics 
As an anthropologist I use the term “politics” rather broadly by referring to social actors’ 
struggles over power relations within and outside the official domains of state government 
and bureaucracy (see Vincent 2002). In this paper, however, I am concerned with perspectives 
and practices of social actors, such as political activists, journalists, politicians and state 
officials, who are either represented or represent themselves as being involved with “politics” 
(siyasat). The emic term refers to “public” domains of government, administration and 
opposition against them. Compared to the majority of the city’s poor and lower-class 
populations, it is Muzaffarabad’s “political” elite, comprising members of the middle and the 
upper classes, who are involved with siyasat as parliamentarians, ministers, state officials, 
oppositional politicians or activists15.  
Borrowing from the anthropological literature on “natural” disasters, I understand the 
earthquake as an “empirical window” (Jenness et al. 2006, ix) into power relations in society 
which shape, and are shaped by, social actors’ disaster vulnerabilities and strategies of 
recovering from destruction and death after the disaster (Oliver-Smith 2002; Oliver-Smith and 
Hoffman 2002). Inextricably linked with political processes, disasters reveal both effects of 
social inequalities and causes of struggles over power disparities in society.     
In this paper I concentrate on “politics of disaster” (Olson 2008) in the context of state 
interventions for “reconstruction” and social actors’ contestations of these interventions after 
the earthquake, and on political processes which affect state–society relations, and vice versa 
(Hilhorst 2003). 
Exposing the state’s failure in protecting its people from destruction and death, the disaster, as 
Olson argues, may undermine the political legitimacy of the government and administration 
(Olson 2008, 157; Olson and Gawronski 2003). But it may also create the opportunity for the 
state to exert influence on society by establishing the government as the principal provider of 
reconstruction to the people. Frequently, in cooperation with international organisations and 
institutions, allocating the required funds, an “enlarged state” (Simpson 2005, 230) emerges 
in order to rehabilitate its people from destruction and death. Thus, disasters often entail the 
emergence of “disaster bureaucracies” as the means by which states (including their regional, 
local and transnational allies) engage in the reconstruction of societies. 
 
15 I have examined elsewhere the political struggles of lower-class social actors in Muzaffarabad with regard to 
practices and representations of homes in the context of the state housing reconstruction policy and bureaucracy 
(Schild 2012).  
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The national and transnational interventions for “reconstruction” are thereby (almost) always 
connected with more extensive schemes to improve, rather than merely reconstruct, societies. 
The “will to improve” underlying rationalities and techniques of “government of population” 
(Foucault 2006, 140) in post-disaster contexts exposes how national and transnational 
interventions for “reconstruction” re-imagine societies along certain ideas and ideologies of 
improvement. Edward Simpson’s “political biography” (2013) of the 2001 Kutch earthquake 
in Gujarat provides a nuanced analysis of “reconstruction” as conflictive processes in which 
urban dwellers, local activist groups, religious organisations, politicians, urban planners, state 
officials and villagers struggled for authority of their particular ideas and ideologies about 
how society should be reconstructed (see also Oliver-Smith 1996, 309–310). 
The earthquake’s aftermath in Muzaffarabad, as I argue, is shaped by similar “politics of 
reconstruction”, although the various actors and institutions, described in this paper, disagreed 
on the implementation of reconstruction projects rather than the projected reconstruction of 
the city and its people. The political contestations of the implementation of projects still 
expose reconstruction as complex and conflictive processes. These political processes, as I 
demonstrate, affect and are affected by “the border” between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir in 
various ways through the practices of local and translocal, state and non-state actors who 
strategically “enact” the border and, thereby, draw and transgress boundaries between “us” 
and “them” and “here” and “there” in order to achieve particular objectives vis-à-vis others. 
Thus, borders and boundaries, as anthropologists have been demonstrating since the 1980s 
(Bode 1989; Oliver-Smith 1986), are crucial techniques of power and politics and in the 
aftermath of disasters. With reference to the reconstruction of Bhuj, the administrative capital 
of Kutch, Simpson illustrates, for instance, how the political boundaries between the region 
and the government of Gujarat were increasingly contested in the earthquake’s aftermath. 
Criticising the government for neglecting the region, people demanded Kutch to become 
independent from Gujarat. Thereby, the protests in Bhuj drew attention to “the old idea that 
Kutch was not Gujarat” (Simpson 2013, 137) and the moment in history when the region 
became part of Gujarat in 1960. According to Simpson the “earthquake had once again 
brought to the fore questions of equality and representations within the political organisation 
of the new state. The earthquake brought to the surface lines of difference that decades of 
state-building had attempted to bury. A tragedy had befallen Kutch, and the state, an entity 
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people saw as charged with their protection, was either behaving like a buffoon or lacked 
compassion at the core” (2013, 137)16.   
 
The Reconstruction of Muzaffarabad 
In Muzaffarabad, reconstruction had turned into a political issue for the above-mentioned 
group of political activists because of the slow implementation of the master plan. The local 
politicisation intensified as the group and its political allies started to address the issue of 
delay through public meetings and protest actions.  
The most severe criticism was directed at the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation 
Authority (ERRA), a large centralised reconstruction authority based in Islamabad. Pakistan 
established ERRA after the disaster to administer the overall reconstruction of earthquake-
affected areas in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. For the reconstruction of Muzaffarabad, ERRA 
officials prepared the master plan in consultation with Japanese engineers, while the Pakistan 
government mobilised the required financial resources in the form of a Chinese loan of 300 
million US dollars. To coordinate the administration and accounting of the master plan 
projects, ERRA installed an office in Muzaffarabad.  
Since the ERRA headquarters in Islamabad was out of reach for local political action, it was 
mostly ERRA’s representatives in Muzaffarabad who were approached by local critics and 
asked to justify the delay of the master plan implementation. In December 2009 I had the 
chance to attend a discussion seminar on the issue organised by a group of political activists. 
For the event, the organisation invited the head of ERRA’s master plan office in 
Muzaffarabad, an Azad Kashmir minister and ex-minister, the chairman of the city’s 
Development Authority and several Azad Kashmir party politicians, along with 
representatives of the local media. Whereas the ERRA’s representative justified the delay by 
referring to the time-consuming project approval procedures which he had to undergo for 
each planning step of every project with the many actors involved, the (ex-)officials from the 
Azad Kashmir government and administration identified the ERRA and its subsidiary as 
 
16 In another case of the imbrications of boundaries and borders with disasters, Simpson examines how in the 
earthquake’s aftermath, religious antagonism increased towards Muslims in Kutch who were represented as 
being disloyal to India and actively fostering alliances with Pakistan. The Indian border with Pakistan, where 
Kutch is located, as Simpson demonstrates, crucially figured in these representations of “the transgressive and 
marginal non-citizen” (2013, 73) Muslims and the consequential activities of Hindu nationalist organisations in 
the borderlands. “In Gujarat, and within India more generally, Kutch in its entirety is regarded as a border 
region: a vulnerable zone at the edge of the nation. Therefore, and given the political climate at the time, the 
prevailing ethos of much of the intervention after the earthquake was to strengthen the border area against 
Pakistan – not by rolling out more barbed wire, but by attempting to create new citizens of various kinds, with 




culprits behind the slow implementation. ERRA, subordinate to the Pakistan prime minister, 
was accused of dominating reconstruction in Azad Kashmir but, in fact, lacking any real 
interest in reconstruction of Azad Kashmir and, therefore, delaying the master plan 
implementation in Muzaffarabad. Referring to the master plan office in Muzaffarabad, which 
was perceived to be subordinate to ERRA, the critics argued that ERRA and the Pakistan 
government sidelined the Azad Kashmir government in the implementation process. At the 
meeting the education minister critically addressed the issue of exclusion of her government 
from authority over ERRA and the reconstruction process respectively. She referred to her 
own department which was not consulted by ERRA for the reconstruction of schools in Azad 
Kashmir. Her criticism implied that, without authority, Azad Kashmir lacked the means to put 
the necessary pressure on ERRA that would prompt Pakistan’s reconstruction authority to 
accelerate implementation. The delay was perceived as being caused by a general disinterest 
in Pakistan regarding the issues of the Azad Kashmir people in general and the people of 
Muzaffarabad in particular. The ex-minister and head of the opposition party repeatedly 
pointed to this fact by stating that their city was destroyed and that their people suffered, not 
ERRA and its officials based far away from the scene, in Islamabad. According to him and 
the other critics, ERRA and its master plan office in Muzaffarabad only served as a means for 
the Pakistani state elite to appropriate financial resources allocated for reconstruction in the 
city for their own purposes. Pakistan, which is in charge of the Chinese loan, was blamed for 
wasting Azad Kashmir’s money, having established expensive offices which pay large 
salaries to its employees comprised mostly of retired Pakistani army officials.   
Pakistan’s domination in regards to financial issues had already been politicised in 2008 when 
ERRA announced that reconstruction projects in the Azad Kashmir cities of Bagh and 
Rawalakot, in addition to the master plan projects for Muzaffarabad, were to be covered by 
the Chinese loan as well. The master plan’s budget for Muzaffarabad city was thus reduced 
from 300 million dollars to 190 million dollars. By this time, Zahid Amin, a local politician 
from Muzaffarabad, was chairman of Muzaffarabad’s Development Authority. He was a 
major critic of ERRA and the budget reallocation. The master plan had been prepared 
according to the original loan of 300 million dollars. The cuts to the budget meant that many 
projects would have to be dropped (Naqash 2008b)17. Amin told me that he addressed the 
issue of financial exploitation in public on October 8, 2008, the earthquake’s third 
 
17 The local politicisation of missing financial resources was intensified by rumours which began to circulate 
after the People’s Party came to power in Pakistan in autumn 2008. It was suspected that Pakistan’s president 
transferred so-called “earthquake money” from ERRA to the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP), the 
People’s Party government’s welfare scheme. 
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anniversary, when a minister from Pakistan and officials from ERRA came to Muzaffarabad 
for the inauguration ceremony of the master plan. He further denounced the event as “fake” 
by pointing out that ERRA’s master plan office had not yet done any work on the projects, 
with planning included. Consequently, Amin was removed as chairman by the Azad Kashmir 
government three months later. The removal, he is convinced, was due to his strong 
opposition to the Pakistan government and ERRA. After all, he publically denounced a 
minister from Pakistan. By means of political pressure and influence in the Azad Kashmir 
bureaucracy, Pakistan got rid of an unpleasing detractor. 
These initial insights into the local politicisation of the master plan delay illustrate how Azad 
Kashmiris enact “the border” between Azad Kashmir and Pakistan and draw the boundary 
between “us” and “them”, “here” and “there”. Representations of the border in these 
situations point to relations of domination and dependence. Azad Kashmiris represent 
themselves as the dependent people, who are oppressed and betrayed by the powerful and 
self-serving Pakistan government. In the context of the earthquake’s aftermath, Pakistan 
wields authority over Azad Kashmir by means of its reconstruction authorities, most notably 
ERRA and its subsidiaries, whereas the Azad Kashmir government is excluded from any 
powers. According to these representations, Pakistan neglects Azad Kashmir’s urgent 
reconstruction needs in order to pursue its own financial interests. Azad Kashmir seems to be 
entirely at Pakistan’s mercy. Since the region lacks representation in Pakistan’s government 
and administration, its political means to affect Pakistan’s decisions and activities (or 
inactivity) regarding reconstruction of Muzaffarabad are few. As the removal of an 
insubordinate Azad Kashmir bureaucrat illustrates, Pakistan, in contrast, has the power to 
interfere in the region’s governmental affairs, by both formal and informal means of political 
pressure.  
Reconstruction, however, offered opportunities for Pakistan to exert influence on Azad 
Kashmir by taking control of the reconstruction process, as well as for local and regional 
actors who address the issue of national domination and engage in politics which aim at 
changing the region’s unequal relations with Pakistan. The earthquake’s effects on the 
existing power relations were, to some extent, contradictory. Providing Pakistan with 
opportunities to strengthen its patron–client-like relationship with Azad Kashmir, 
reconstruction also exposed the patron’s failure to look satisfactorily after his client. The 
master plan implementation delay also undermined Pakistan’s legitimacy as the dominant 
actor of reconstruction in and of Azad Kashmir. 
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Expressing frustration regarding their economic and political dependence on Pakistan, Azad 
Kashmir politicians challenge Pakistan’s hegemony. Their representation of Pakistani 
domination as limiting their scope of action, however, is also situational and strategic. The 
region’s political relation with Pakistan is much more complicated and ambiguous than the 
sweeping accusations at ERRA or the government in Islamabad, which were put forward by 
these politicians. Their criticism is based on the assumption that the Pakistan–Azad Kashmir 
border essentially entails a relation of domination and subordination. Reconstruction is thus 
politicised within this dualistic political framework. There was, however, local criticism 
which contrasted this simplistic confrontation of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir, pointing to the 
locality of Muzaffarabad vis-à-vis the Azad Kashmir and Pakistan governments. 
Reconstruction in Muzaffarabad was perceived not only to be an issue of Azad Kashmir, 
which is neglected by the Pakistan government, but also to be a local issue of Muzaffarabad, 
which is also neglected by the Azad Kashmir government. From this perspective, the 
disinterest of both the Pakistan reconstruction authority and the Azad Kashmir government 
caused the delay of master plan implementation in Muzaffarabad.  
This local concern was raised by, among others, a journalist from Muzaffarabad, Tariq 
Naqash, who frequently reports on Azad Kashmir for a Pakistani English-language 
newspaper. Though he admitted that some of the reconstruction affairs were beyond the 
authority of the Azad Kashmir government, he stressed in an interview with me that others 
were not. According to him, ERRA and the Azad Kashmir government were jointly 
responsible for the master plan delay. He harshly criticised the above-mentioned minister’s 
statement about her department’s exclusion by ERRA. According to him, the minister was not 
resolute enough in her actions taken against ERRA and, thus, failed to fulfil her duty as a 
representative of the affected people, which was to take care of their reconstruction needs18. It 
seems that the minister, by criticising ERRA for restricting Azad Kashmir’s influence, 
attempted to avoid criticism directed at herself as a member of the government. A government 
devoid of crucial powers cannot be made responsible for failures. Thus, what she designated 
as “exclusion from authority”, Naqash referred to as a “lack of interest” in reconstruction 
affairs. In quite similar words, an ERRA official, whom I visited in the Islamabad 
headquarters, represented the Azad Kashmir government’s “exclusion” as the “refusal to take 
 
18 “While I had questioned ERRA I had not spared our own government, you know. They are equally to be 
blamed. They can not allow themselves of... like the Minister AJK [Azad Kashmir] says that ‘I’m not aware 
what is going on’. Why you are sitting in the office? He [sic] should have [...] resigned, he [sic] should quit then. 
That lady belongs to an affected area. [...] If she says that ‘I’m not aware’... Why you are sitting in the 
government for the past [...] three or four years? When did you raise voice against it?” (Naqash interviewed by 
the author, Dec. 26, 2009).  
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over responsibility”. In his view, it was not ERRA which deprived Azad Kashmir of authority 
over reconstruction, but the government itself which attempted to abdicate responsibility. 
ERRA officials and local activists alike argued that the Azad Kashmir government was 
involved in the master plan implementation. As the projects required the acquisition of 
government and private land, the Azad Kashmir government was responsible for providing 
the necessary plots to ERRA’s master plan office in Muzaffarabad, but, apparently, failed to 
do so. According to these Muzaffarabadis, the Azad Kashmir government did not care about 
the reconstruction of their city because its politicians were not from Muzaffarabad, but from 
other constituencies in Azad Kashmir. Instead of pressing ahead with the reconstruction of the 
city and providing the required land, the ministers prioritised their own constituencies for 
reconstruction in order to seek re-election. The government thus complied with ERRA and the 
national government, not because Azad Kashmir is a powerless actor vis-à-vis Pakistan, but 
because in particular situations opportunism suits the politicians more than opposition against 
Islamabad does. 
As evidenced by Azad Kashmir’s historical trajectories, neither conflict nor complicity with 
the power holders in Islamabad is unusual for Azad Kashmir politicians (Rose 1992; Snedden 
2012). Rather, it seems that politics in Azad Kashmir are profoundly shaped by frequent 
alternations of opposition and cooperation vis-à-vis Pakistan. 
The complicity between national and regional actors was also the background of the local 
political alliance, which was launched by Zahid Amin after his removal as chairman of the 
city’s development authority in order to pressure the Azad Kashmir government to take a 
more active part in the reconstruction of Muzaffarabad. Amin organised another public 
meeting on the delay of the master plan implementation. As a well-known politician he was 
able to mobilise about three hundred “people from the city” to join the event: journalists, 
politicians from different political parties, officers, religious leaders, representatives from 
different groups (such as the traders’ union and local activist groups and non-governmental 
organisations), and the Azad Kashmir prime minister at that time, Raja Farooq Haider. The 
seminar’s objectives, as he explained to me, were to sensitise the participants to the city’s 
reconstruction concerns, to unite them for political action, and to assist (and pressure) the 
prime minister in acting on behalf of the city (and to oppose ERRA and the Pakistan 
government if necessary). According to Amin, Farooq Haider differed from his predecessors, 
insofar as he was, despite his rural constituency, comparatively open-minded about the city’s 
reconstruction concerns. In cooperation with a local branch of an international non-
governmental organisation, Amin finally realised the idea of a widespread Muzaffarabad 
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alliance and set up the reconstruction movement (Tahrik-e-Tamir-e-Nau). It engaged in 
political campaigns which attracted media attention, but, at the same time, also put a strong 
emphasis on informal lobbying. The participants were encouraged to approach their friends 
and relatives working in public institutions of Azad Kashmir in order to convince them of the 
necessity of pressing ahead with the master plan implementation. 
Probably because the Pakistan government is beyond the scope of local political pressure, 
Amin and his fellows focused their activities exclusively on the Azad Kashmir government 
and administration. The movement’s political actions, however, clearly pointed to the 
opposition between local interests and regional politics in Azad Kashmir. From the local 
perspective, the relations between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir are characterised not only by 
domination and dependence but also by cooperation and complicity, which go against local 
concerns such as the reconstruction of Muzaffarabad. The opposition between Azad Kashmir 
and Pakistan occasionally merges into cooperation, and local actors may ally themselves at 




The political ambiguities of domination and subordination, opposition and cooperation, which 
characterise Azad Kashmir’s relations with Pakistan, are also exposed by the wrangling over 
funds, authority and blame among the different officials involved in the “reconstruction 
bureaucracy”. As anthropological approaches to “the state” suggest, state government and 
administration must always be thought of as “fragmented” and consisting of a contradictory 
ensemble of people, practices and representations (Gupta 1995; Mitchell 2006; Sharma and 
Gupta 2006). Despite their apolitical representation and supposed “rationality”, bureaucratic 
procedures are closely intertwined with power relations. In the case of reconstruction in Azad 
Kashmir the bureaucratic “fragmentation” is closely associated with the region’s ambiguous 
political status vis-à-vis Pakistan.  
Whereas Pakistan’s domination over Azad Kashmir with regard to the overall ERRA-
controlled reconstruction administration is obvious, the particular case of the master plan in 
Muzaffarabad shows a much more complex picture of the national government’s interference 
in the local reconstruction process. 
It was the head of ERRA’s master plan offices in Muzaffarabad who drew my attention to the 
complicated and extensive bureaucratic procedures involved in the master plan 
implementation. In addition to this office, two committees were established to approve and 
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monitor the project designs: one comprising of ERRA officials and another of representatives 
from the Azad Kashmir administration. ERRA officials frequently told me that the Azad 
Kashmir committee allowed for the participation of Azad Kashmir in the reconstruction of 
Muzaffarabad. However, this formal involvement of Azad Kashmir in the city’s 
reconstruction masked the actual power relations that shaped the master plan implementation. 
By officially including the Azad Kashmir administration, the master plan bureaucracy aimed 
to conceal Pakistan’s actual domination. Though Azad Kashmir was given the formal right to 
refuse designs for the projects, it was not in a position to overrule ERRA’s decisions. The 
Azad Kashmir committee’s seats were filled with heads of the state’s departments and 
authorities, including administrative staff appointed by the Pakistan government, e.g. the chief 
secretary of Azad Kashmir, and the head of ERRA’s master plan office in Muzaffarabad. 
Azad Kashmir’s participation was restricted, since these Pakistani officials within the 
committee would most likely not oppose ERRA.  
Interestingly, the master plan office, which was perceived by Azad Kashmiris as being 
subordinate to ERRA, was represented by ERRA as part of the Azad Kashmir administration. 
In an interview, however, the head of the office in Muzaffarabad contradicted this official 
representation by explaining to me that he had, in fact, two bosses. Admitting the close 
affiliation with Pakistan and ERRA, he described the office as an intermediary between 
ERRA and the Azad Kashmir government. 
The ambivalence regarding authority reveals the reconstruction bureaucracy as conflict-ridden 
processes which entail frequent rivalries between national, regional and local actors over 
funds, responsibility and blame.  
A case of such bureaucratic rivalry existed between ERRA’s master plan office in 
Muzaffarabad and the city’s Development Authority. Initially, the Japanese designers of the 
master plan selected the Development Authority as the main implementer. The local 
authority, however, was later sidelined by ERRA, which took control of the implementation 
process by establishing its subsidiary office as the chief implementer instead. Nevertheless, 
ERRA and its officials from Islamabad rely on the expertise and cooperation of the 
Development Authority, since it is in charge of overall urban planning and development in 
Muzaffarabad. The installation of the master plan office as the sole administrator of funds, 
planning and implementation displaced the local authority from its initial responsibility, 
ascribed to it by the master plan designers. The shifting of powers from the city’s 
Development Authority to ERRA’s master plan office caused tensions between the two 
authorities. One of the planned projects, the construction of satellite towns outside of 
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Muzaffarabad, is one example, where the rivalry between the two institutions turned into a 
problem for the overall implementation process. The satellite towns should provide living 
space for the people who dwell in highly hazardous areas and for those who are affected by 
other projects of the master plan. Though the Azad Kashmir government had already claimed 
most of the land, the infrastructural development of the areas has yet to take place. According 
to officials, the former inhabitants of the satellite towns’ sites started to reoccupy their land by 
building simple shelters on it, hoping to obtain additional compensation for already acquired 
and compensated land. These officially termed “encroachments” provoked a conflict between 
the two authorities. Officials of the master plan office accused the Development Authority of 
not fencing the area appropriately. The local authority, on the other hand, accused the ERRA 
office of not giving it sufficient funds — either for the fence or for additional personnel to 
take care of the encroachments. 
Whereas Pakistan officials frequently criticised the inactivity of the Azad Kashmir 
government and administration, blaming it for the lack of political will to acquire the required 
land for the master plan projects, Azad Kashmir officials often argued that due to the shortage 
of funds (which lie with ERRA) the reconstruction of Muzaffarabad could not proceed19. 
The conflictive reconstruction bureaucracy in Muzaffarabad reflects Pakistan’s ambivalent 
political agenda towards Azad Kashmir. In fact, Pakistan is much interested in the state’s 
political cohesion and solidarity, as these stem the drive towards secession and independence. 
Vis-à-vis India and “occupied” Indian Kashmir, Pakistan depends on “free” Kashmir’s loyalty 
with the ideology of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. Avoiding Kashmiri opposition to 
Pakistan’s territorial claim over Kashmir, Pakistan has been integrating Azad Kashmir into 
the nation state. This practical infringement on Azad Kashmir’s “freedom” contradicts official 
representation. However, to maintain the illusion of “free Kashmir”, Pakistan attempts to 
conceal its efforts to dominate politics in Azad Kashmir. The “reconstruction bureaucracy” 
established by Pakistan after the earthquake reveals this duplicity20. Although Azad Kashmir 
 
19 In addition to the time-consuming project approval procedure, the head of ERRA’s master plan office also 
blamed the Chinese companies for delaying implementation. The Chinese loan was bound to the condition that 
the Chinese government would choose the companies working on the master plan projects. Therefore, the 
contractors were not selected by a market-based procedure. The Chinese were thus blamed for demanding 
unreasonable rates for the projects and thereby protracting the contract negotiations and making them extremely 
difficult. This representation of the delay was challenged by a representative of a Chinese company which 
pointed to the poor performance of the master plan office and the National Engineering Services of Pakistan 
(NESPAK), ERRA’s technical consultant. According to him, the office was not equipped with sufficient 
personnel and cars to adequately keep the pace of reconstruction. (I owe the insight regarding the Chinese 
contractors’ point of view to my colleague, Stefan Urban, who talked to the representative of the company 
involved in the master plan implementation.)   
20 The Azad Kashmir council, comprising Pakistani and Azad Kashmiri politicians, reflects a similar duplicity 
structure with regard to legislation (see page 3).   
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officially participates in the master plan implementation, it generally lacks the means to 
challenge ERRA’s authority over the process. The region’s involvement in reconstruction is 
somewhat of a farce that supports the official representation of “free Kashmir” and, thus, 
conceals its practical subordination to Pakistan’s reconstruction authority.  
By formally including but simultaneously depriving Azad Kashmir of actual authority, the 
complicated and time-consuming procedures of the master plan implementation aim at 
strengthening Pakistan’s (hidden) hegemony, rather than implementing the projects 
appropriately. This conflicting bureaucracy seems to be among the main reasons for the delay.  
The bureaucratic rivalries and conflicts over funds, authority and blame, however, indicate 
that Pakistan’s domination over reconstruction is contested and negotiated within the master 
plan bureaucracy in Muzaffarabad. Whereas Pakistan is comparatively successful in 
preventing Azad Kashmir politics from crossing the border and reaching out into Pakistan, it 
fails to avert the bureaucratic struggles between national, regional and local officials in 
Muzaffarabad. As a consequence, the unequal power relations between Pakistan and Azad 
Kashmir are revealed in several conflicts; the national narrative of “free Kashmir”, itself an 
effect of the border, is thus also proved wrong.    
 
Shifting Alliances across the Border 
Though the conflictive bureaucracy complicated the implementation of the master plan, its 
ambiguities and contradictions, nonetheless, allowed for political strategies to accelerate 
reconstruction. By creating alliances with Pakistan-affiliated individuals, local actors in 
Muzaffarabad attempted to avoid bureaucratic wrangling as well as struggles in Azad 
Kashmir’s party politics, which obstructed the implementation of the master plan. These 
strategic border crossings take advantage of Pakistan’s domination over Azad Kashmir in 
order to enforce local interests in Azad Kashmir’s government and administration. Since the 
national government, however, frequently infringes on Azad Kashmir’s political affairs, the 
scope of local political actions is thus rather limited.            
Engaging in informal lobbying, the participants of the local reconstruction movement (Tarik-e 
Tamir-e Nau) approached particular networked individuals within the government and 
administration of Azad Kashmir. Initially, the movement focused on Azad Kashmir, but 
ultimately expanded the scope of action towards Pakistan when the opportunity arose to ally 
itself with Marvi Memon, an opposition politician and member of the national assembly of 
Pakistan. Memon actively supported the movement and took part in public actions, such as 
the march to Islamabad in October 2010. In this political protest march a few hundred Azad 
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Kashmiris demonstrated in front of the Pakistan Parliament against the delay of 
reconstruction. According to a local political activist, Marvi Memon (who headed the protest) 
managed not only to have the police grant the protestors access to the restricted Parliament 
area, but also to have the protestors’ representatives discuss their concerns in a meeting with 
the Pakistan Minister of Interior. Through the alliance with Marvi Memon, the movement 
attracted public attention outside of Azad Kashmir, in Islamabad where the policies affecting 
the region are actually formulated and approved. The alliance with the Pakistani politician 
reflects the strategic effort not only to mitigate Azad Kashmir’s lack of formal political 
representation in Pakistan in general, but also to strengthen Muzaffarabad’s position within 
Azad Kashmir politics. The alliance was aimed at pressuring Pakistan and ERRA so that they 
acknowledge the interests of Muzaffarabadis regarding the reconstruction of their city and 
then represent these interests vis-à-vis the Azad Kashmir government.  
Local attempts to forge alliances with influential persons from Pakistan, and even ERRA, 
already existed in the early stages of reconstruction. In 2006, political activism in 
Muzaffarabad was characterised by a strong opposition to the government of the then-prime 
minister of Azad Kashmir, Sardar Attiq. Attiq rejected the master plan for Muzaffarabad. 
Instead of rebuilding the city in situ, he entertained plans to shift the capital city near Bagh, 
where his own political constituency is located. Zahid Amin, the then-chairman of the city’s 
Development Authority, supported the master plan and criticised the idea to shift the capital. 
He explained to me that ERRA by that time was with him and the city people. By means of an 
alliance with the deputy chairman of ERRA, he approached the Pakistan government directly 
to put pressure on Attiq’s government. General Nadeem, the deputy chairman of ERRA, was 
a friend of Amin’s. As he told me, they had known each other since the 1990s, when Nadeem 
was stationed as an army officer in Muzaffarabad. ERRA and the Pakistan government then 
approved the master plan and ultimately forced Attiq to do the same and to give up his plans 
of shifting the capital.  
These examples of alliances between actors from Muzaffarabad and Pakistan reveal that local 
actors may take advantage of Pakistan’s domination over Azad Kashmir. Out of consideration 
for the reconstruction of Muzaffarabad, they utilised Pakistan’s political power to subjugate 
the Azad Kashmir power holders to the will of the national government, which in these 
particular situations was equated with local interests.  
The alliances, however, were bound to two specific actors from Pakistan, Marvi Memon and 
General Nadeem respectively. After the latter left ERRA, the alliance broke apart. Amin later 
strongly opposed ERRA and the Pakistan government. As a consequence, he had to vacate his 
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office and, subsequently, started to politicise the city’s reconstruction from outside the 
bureaucracy. Approaching the Azad Kashmir government and administration, Amin’s 
reconstruction movement finally attracted the support of the then-prime minister, Farooq 
Haider, who reappointed Amin as chairman of the city’s development authority. By 2010, 
Amin was again in a position to press ahead with the implementation of the master plan. He 
immediately took an active part in managing the coordination between ERRA, its master plan 
office in Muzaffarabad, the administration of Azad Kashmir, and the Chinese contractors. 
Within just a few months he started the construction of several projects. Again, the 
importance of committed individual actors within the bureaucracy was clearly evinced by the 
new and active part of the Development Authority in the master plan implementation.  
Amin’s commitment, however, strained the Development Authority’s resources. He thus 
approached the chief secretary of Azad Kashmir and managed to get an additional budget for 
the authority’s increasing expenses. Because of political discrepancies with Sardar Attiq, who, 
after Farooq Haider, became prime minister again, Amin bypassed Attiq’s government and 
allied himself with the head of the Azad Kashmir administration. The chief secretary, who is 
appointed by the Pakistan government, approved the budget allocation for the Development 
Authority. Amin explained to me that even the prime minister of Azad Kashmir could hardly 
oppose the decisions of the head of Azad Kashmir’s administration. Nevertheless, in a last-
minute manoeuver the prime minister managed to stop the transfer of additional funds to the 
Development Authority. 
Amin interpreted the interference in local reconstruction by the prime minister in the context 
of the upcoming elections in Azad Kashmir and the political struggles within the ruling 
Muslim Conference, dominated by the “Qayyum dynasty” and its allies. Sardar Attiq, the son 
of Sardar Qayyum (who had previously served as party president, Azad Kashmir’s prime 
minister and president), leads the Qayyum block of the Muslim Conference. Zahid Amin, 
however, is affiliated with the “forward block”, a party faction that frequently opposes the 
Qayyum block. Among other reasons, the conflict between the two factions already escalated 
during Attiq’s first term in office because of the steps he took to relocate the capital. 
According to Amin, the “forward block”, led by Farooq Haider, party president and member 
of the Legislative Assembly of Azad Kashmir at that time, had supported the city people’s 
opposition to Attiq’s plans (Naqash 2007). In January 2009 an alliance between the forward 
block of the Muslim Conference and oppositional parties of Azad Kashmir jointly issued a 
no-confidence motion against Attiq’s government in the Legislative Assembly. Subsequently, 
Attiq was replaced as prime minister by the independent and compromise candidate, 
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Muhammad Yaqoob. As the Muslim Conference reunified, the Legislative Assembly 
dismissed Yaqoob, after only 10 months in office, and appointed Farooq Haider as the new 
prime minister. Haider’s government, however, did not last for long either. He resigned from 
his office to avoid the parliament’s vote on a no-confidence motion which was issued against 
him by his former intra-party rivals, the Qayyum block headed by Sardar Attiq. Although 
Attiq, who became prime minister again in July 2010, did not remove his political opponent, 
Zahid Amin, from the Development Authority, the power struggle between the Muslim 
Conference factions impeded its administrative performance in the process of the master plan 
implementation. 
It was widely assumed that Amin planned to contest the upcoming elections of 2011 in the 
urban constituency of Muzaffarabad. Attiq’s Muslim Conference, however, refused to support 
Amin as an official party candidate. Attiq presented his own son, Usman Attiq, as an official 
candidate in the city’s constituency. The prime minister thus stopped the transfer of the 
additional budget to the Development Authority in order to minimise Amin’s scope of 
political action. As chairman of the Development Authority, Amin was well positioned to 
launch his political election campaign in the city. Attiq feared that Amin’s commitment 
regarding the master plan implementation would further increase his popularity in 
Muzaffarabad and the possibility that he (and not his son) would be elected as Member of the 
Legislative Assembly from Muzaffarabad. Attiq attempted to sabotage Amin’s election by 
limiting the Authority’s resources and agency. Thus, delaying the master plan implementation 
was a political strategy which aimed at preventing Amin from attracting attention and gaining 
public appreciation for his contribution towards reconstruction of Muzaffarabad. 
Amin’s alliance with the chief secretary, officially appointed by the national government, was 
an attempt to avoid struggles in Azad Kashmir’s party politics. Again, Pakistan’s domination 
was utilised to enforce local (and personal) political interests against the Azad Kashmir 
government — although the strategy was not successful. 
Crossing the border from Azad Kashmir into Pakistan, local politics parallels Pakistan’s 
frequent strategic manoeuvring across it. The political party struggles in Azad Kashmir are 
not merely “internal” affairs, but crucially determined by the involvement of “external” party 
politics from Pakistan.21 Citing a former Azad Kashmir prime minister, Asif states that Azad 
 
21 With the coming to power of the People’s Party in Pakistan in 2008, the government of Attiq’s Muslim 
Conference, backed by the former national government of General Musharraf, became an oppositional 
government to Pakistan. As a consequence, political tensions between Muzaffarabad and Islamabad increased. It 
is widely believed that the new government in Pakistan attempted to destabilise and weaken Azad Kashmir. 
“They do not want a strong government [in Azad Kashmir],” a political activist from Muzaffarabad told me. The 
frequent changes of Azad Kashmir prime ministers, in general, during the legislative period from 2006 till 2011 
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Kashmir elections in general are “managed by Islamabad to ensure that ‘the party affiliate of 
the ruling party in Islamabad comes to power in [Azad Kashmir]’” (Asif 2009, 37). 
Unsurprisingly, in the most recent elections held in June 2011, the People’s Party branch in 
Azad Kashmir became the new ruling party. The victory was supported by Attiq’s Muslim 
Conference, which collaborated with the People’s Party and the government in Islamabad, 
most likely because the People’s Party had supported Attiq earlier by replacing his intra-party 
rival, Haider, as prime minister. Consequently, Haider left the Muslim Conference and set up 
an Azad Kashmir branch of Pakistan’s Muslim League (Nawaz), the People’s Party’s main 
political opponent in Pakistan. As a result of these political moves, the cleavages 
characterising official politics in Pakistan became (again) incorporated into Azad Kashmir’s 
political landscape. Among the many ways in which Pakistan asserts itself in Azad Kashmir, 
Snedden concludes that it is the local “politicians [who] ‘play’ Pakistan’s ‘game’, thereby 
strengthening Islamabad’s position” (Snedden 2012, 215). 
 
Conclusion 
As anthropologists such as Edward Simpson most recently have been demonstrating 
(Simpson 2013), boundaries and borders within and between societies and states crucially 
figure in the aftermath of “natural” disasters because of social actors’ often conflicting 
strategies of coping with destruction and death. In this paper I examined processes of 
“bordering” between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir in the context of reconstruction after the 
earthquake in Muzaffarabad. Struggles over reconstruction in Muzaffarabad, as I 
demonstrated, are related to the border through social actors’ various representations and 
practices along as well as across it. 
With reference to historical perspectives on the legal political ambiguities of autonomy and 
dependence, I argued that the political relations between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir imply 
domination and subordination as well as opposition and cooperation. Whereas domination 
was revealed after the earthquake in the ways in which Pakistan “administrated” 
reconstruction in the region by establishing its Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation 
Authority (ERRA) as the head of the disaster bureaucracy in Muzaffarabad, opposition was 
evident in the criticism that the nation state’s domination over reconstruction provoked among 
political actors in Muzaffarabad. The wrangling about funds, authority and blame among 
 
— Sardar Attiq (July 2006–Jan. 2009), Yaqoob Khan (Jan. 2009–Oct. 2009), Farooq Haider (Oct. 2009–July 
2010) and again Sardar Attiq (July 2010–June 2011) — and the removal of Farooq Haider, in particular, were 
supposed to be caused by Pakistan’s interference in the region. Haider was well known for his opposition to the 
People’s Party government in Islamabad. In the past, he had also frequently criticised ERRA for delaying 
reconstruction in Muzaffarabad (Naqash 2008a). 
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local, regional and national officials within the reconstruction bureaucracy exposed processes 
of contestation and negotiation of the border and consequential power relations. Despite 
providing Pakistan with a means to subjugate Azad Kashmir, it also enabled local activists 
and regional politicians to address the issue of Pakistan’s interference in Azad Kashmir’s 
“internal” affairs and, thus, to claim Azad Kashmir’s (theoretical) autonomy from Pakistan in 
the face of the region’s (practical) dependence on the nation state. Azad Kashmir politicians 
are “anything but passive subjects kowtowing to Islamabad” (Asif 2009, 38). Their agency 
vis-à-vis Pakistan, however, involved not only opposition against Pakistan, but also 
cooperation with Pakistan. Crossing the border into Pakistan, the complicity of regional power 
holders with the national government, as the politicisation of reconstruction in Muzaffarabad 
demonstrates, clashed with local concerns such as the implementation of reconstruction 
projects. Producing a boundary within Azad Kashmir, namely between “the local people” and 
“the regional government”, the “vacillating” border is “both multiplied and reduced […] 
thinned out and doubled” (Balibar 1998, 220). Participating in these border processes, local 
actors criticised regional politicians’ complicity with Pakistan and insisted on the Azad 
Kashmir government’s loyalty with the people of Muzaffarabad. If necessary, as the 
“reconstruction movement” demanded, the state’s loyalty with its citizens must go as far as 
opposing the nation state of Pakistan. Though local political actors maintained the Pakistan–
Azad Kashmir border and insisted on the region’s internal autonomy from Pakistan, they also 
crossed the border into Pakistan through the creation of alliances with particular Pakistan-
affiliated individuals. In taking advantage of Pakistan’s domination over Azad Kashmir, local 
activities across the border, however, not only infringed on Azad Kashmir’s autonomy but 
also disrupted Pakistan’s hegemony by revealing the nation state’s “fragmentation”. The 
ambiguous and contradictory politics in “the margin”, as I would argue with reference to Das 
and Poole (2004), exposed multilayered and contradictory processes which undermined, most 
notably, dominant (self-)representations of “the Pakistani state” as a bureaucratically 
rationalised and centrally organised sovereignty. With reference to decentred perspectives on 
“the state” and “its” boundaries in anthropology, I approached the Pakistan–Azad Kashmir 
border as processes of negotiation and contestation between local and translocal, state and 
non-state actors (rather than between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir or “the state” and “the 
people”). Substantiating these theoretical perspectives, my ethnographic data illustrate how 
local alliances with national actors not only failed but also succeeded in manipulating 
Pakistan’s techniques of “government of population” (Foucault 2006) in Muzaffarabad. 
Although local politics along and across the border were determined by Pakistan’s domination 
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over Azad Kashmir and the national government’s frequent interferences in the region’s 
political affairs, they also sowed dissension and created confusion among national actors, 
through constantly shifting the border’s sides, and, thus, at times, manipulated Pakistan’s 
overall hegemony in Azad Kashmir and sabotaged “their” politicians’ cooperation and 
complicity with the power holders in Islamabad.  
The ambiguities and contradictions of the Pakistan–Azad Kashmir border, which figures in 
politics as both a “national” and “regional” state boundary, “are a necessary entailment of the 
state, much as the exception is a necessary component of the rule” (Das and Poole 2004, 4). 
Although the border refers to an exceptional legal political boundary in South Asia (Snedden 
2012, 94), explainable by the specific historical trajectories of the Kashmir conflict between 
Pakistan and India, it also points to ordinary processes in “the social margin” of the state, and 
to ambiguities and contradictions that pervade the alleged certainty and consistency of the 
centre. Despite being material and territorial, borders between and within states (Piliavsky 
2013) are always also symbolical and practical. They are created and recreated through the 
practices and representations of local and translocal, state and non-state actors who enact 
borders and draw and transgress boundaries between “us” and “them” and “here” and “there” 
in the context of contemporary struggles over power relations in society. The further 
ethnography of “politics of regionalism” in Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir may reveal 
similar local contestations and negotiations of national interferences in regional affairs. It is, 
however, yet to examine whether and to what extent the Pakistan–Azad Kashmir border 
resembles and differs from other borders of Jammu and Kashmir and borders within Pakistan 
and other nation states. Such examinations would advance the anthropology of borders and 
substantiate, most notably, the concept of borders as vacillating between national, regional 
and local, state and social boundaries.   
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